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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this work is to empirically assess the determinants used in global value chain governance tr ade 
through interfirm relationship and their effect on competitive advantage of horticultural value chains in developing 
economies. The paper is based on a  Kenyan survey of 83 horticultural exporters of fresh fruits and vegetables 
accessed out of 120 exporters registered with Fresh Produce Association of Kenya (FPEAK) and Horticultural Crops 
Directorate (HCD). It employs a nonlinear principal component analysis procedure of categorical principal 
component analysis (CATPCA). From the CATPCA output, five components considered to be key food value chain 
governance determinants affecting the export oriented horticultural value chain in Kenya were extracted and 
named as standards & certification, nature of transactions, level of chain integration, nature of cont ract  and 
relational characteristics. The current research shows that with prioritisation of requisite food safety standards & 
certification schemes and discernment of transactional demands of heterogeneous export markets, horticultural 
exporters may expect to be competitive by means of improved product differentiation, process flows, logistical 
advantage and promotion of marketing & organisation management innovativeness. The implication therefore to 
the chain managers that standards & certification schemes are taking a critical position in determining food value 
chain governance especially through remote governance or governance from a distance other than the governance 
structure continuum of markets and hierarchies previously defined by transactional cost  economics. 
Keywords: Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CATPCA), nonlinear principal components analysis, governance 
structures, standards, Fresh fruits & Vegetables, Kenya 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Prior to global value chains (GVC) literature was the Global Commodity Chains literature. The underlying 
theme of governance in GCCs as previous developed by Gereffi (1994), relates to governance as a driver 
where much of the attention was in line with the trade-off between producer driven versus buyer driven 
governance forms (Dolan, Humphrey, & Harris-Pascal, 1999). Value chain nuance was later adopted to 
briefly broaden the understanding of how producers at upstream nodes of production are linked with 
their end markets, including manufacturers/retailers at downstream nodes. The dimensions providing this 
linkage as elaborated by Gereffi, (1994); Humphrey and Schmitz, (2002) is based on four different 
dimensions: 1) Input-output structures as forms of co-operation within a value chain for  the 
manufacturing or processing a product; 2) spatial patterns which demonstrate the various value chain 
activities dispersed in the various regions or countries; 3) Institutional framework dimension that relates 
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to the regulations affecting the interaction of the value creation at the national or international level and 
4) governance structure(s) which are largely concerned with the distribution of financial, material, and 
human resources within a value chain and their influence on the interaction and co-operation of the firm 
or actors in the chain. While the former three dimension remain largely descriptive, the latter dimension  
on governance stands out as a dimension that has generated the largest GVC discourse.  
Value chain governance concept has been promoted as consequence of the emergent new approaches to 
supply chain management largely based on allocation of resources to core competencies and an increased 
trend towards outsourcing and sub-contracting of non-core functions; other approaches to adoption of 
GVC governance resonates with support of actors in the chain, setting of rules, the monitoring of 
compliance to the rules and punishment for violation of the rules (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2000). This trend 
has resulted to a general loss of control over the stages of production and distribution process especially 
to geographically dispersed regions. Vurro, Angeloantonio and Francesco, (2009) explain the rationale of 
broadening the concept of value chain governance from inter-firm relationships to global fora; this is due 
to the coincidence of falling regulatory barriers to international trade, advances in communication 
technologies and declining transportation costs. GVC scholarship has therefore continued to explore how 
changes in the organisation and coordination of global trade and production characterised in part by the 
splitting up of production processes between countries (Keane, 2012); and the promotion of functional 
integration especially in the areas of comparative advantage promoted through the lower entry barriers. 
Equally well, the mere entry into such value chains offers a huge potential for upgrading (Dallas, 2015) 
especially in form of knowledge sharing between the global North and global South. Other than these 
benefits, production outsourcing has posed challenges in relation to the integration complexities in the 
context in which international production and trade portends.  
While, GVC literature has had Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) literature as its precursor; the underlying 
theme of governance in GCCs as previous developed by Gereffi (1994), has garnered much attention in 
line with the trade-off between producer driven versus buyer driven governance forms (Dolan, Humphrey, 
and Harris-Pascal, 1999)   in promotion of value adding activities and processes along the supply chain of a 
given product from its raw state up to its completion and immediate sate before consumption. The value 
chain nuance in GVC literature broaden the understanding of how producers as upstream agents of 
production are linked with their end markets, including retailers as the downstream agents.  
GVC studies have therefore continued to explore how changes in organisations and coordination of global 
trade and production characterised by the fragmentation of production processes between countries 
(Keane, 2012) has taken form as well as impacted the general international political economy. To Dallas, 
(2015) amongst other GVC scholars the effect of fragmented production has attracted keen interest in 
underscoring the opportunities and limitations engendered by the integration of the developing and the 
developed economies in the global North-South relations; other than the coordination of the global 
chains, conceptualization and measurement of ‘value’  and value appropriatio n has been endeared 
(Hammervoll, 2009, 2011) especially flowing from the borderless production systems and the effects of 
factors of production in promoting functional, products and social upgrading.  
This paper seeks to ascertain  the determinants of inter-firm governance as proposed in literature  by 
Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) on complexity of transactions, codification of transactions and 
supply base capabilities. The determinant on complexity of transaction is rearticulated as nature of 
transactions; codification of standards have been redefined under the codifications found in standards 
and certifications (Baars et al., 2016; Hatanaka et al., 2006; Hatanaka et al., 2005; Henson & Humphrey, 
2010; Konefal, Mascarenhas, & Hatanaka, 2005; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005; von Hagen & Alvarez, 2011);  
supply bases capabilities  are elaborated under the lenses of nature of contract(s) between the  GVC chain 
actors (Ghosh & John, 1999, 2005; Gyau & Spiller, 2008; Ji, Felipe, Briz, & Trienekens, 2012; Madhok, 
1996, 2005) and their level of chain integration (Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010; Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; 
Maleki & Cruz-machado, 2013; Moharana, Murty, Senapati, & Khuntia, 2012) as found relevant to 
agricultural value chains in developing economies (Dolan, 2004; Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002; Kirsten & 
Sartorius, 2002; Ochieng, 2007; Vlachos, 2014).  
The assessment in this paper is based on Kenya’s horticultural sector specifically the fresh fruits and 
vegetables’ exports (forthwith referred to as FFV); the sector traces its transition of governance from spot 
markets in the 1960s to hybrid forms of governance from the 1990s onwards.  While previous rese arch 
into the Kenyan horticultural value chains conducted Dolan and Humphrey, (2000)  sought to answer to 
the actors  that defined what the chain requires, and how their requirements were transmitted to the 
various actors in the chain, this research  sought to establish whether the GVC determinants specified by 
Gereffi et al (2005) are plausible with entry of European supermarkets chains in the 1990s in the niche 
markets for fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV) which changed the entire scope of food value chai n 
governance’s activities, decisions and their implications (Hernández & Pedersen, 2017). 
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Further to the trajectory that GVC scholarship research has taken, this paper notes two shortcomings have 
been levelled against it, namely; first, the basis from which value appropriation is identified on the various 
forms of governance under which firms/ chain actors operate  in order to achieve value  creation (Ghosh & 
John, 2005; Hammervoll, 2009, 2011); and second, the dependence of GVC insights largely being based on 
in-depth case studies as cited in the cases relating to garments (Gereffi, 1999), footwear (Schmitz, 1999), 
electronics (Sturgeon, 2002) and horticulture (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000)  and thus the need for empirical 
testing (Dallas, 2015; Gellynck & Molnár, 2009; Ghosh & John, 2005; Hammervoll, 2011)  for corroboration 
of the case study method. To overcome the latter shortcoming, this paper utilises survey data from 83 
export oriented horticultural firms to assess the various governance determinants affecting the 
horticultural value chains.  
The following sections of the paper are structured as follows. Firstly, the theoretical background on global 
value chains and application of conventional theory is discussed. Secondly, literature review on the global 
value chain governance determinants are discussed together with the formation of hypotheses.  Thirdly, 
methodology in elaborated and findings with their discussions are fourthly offered; lastly, the paper offers 
conclusion. 
2 Theoretical Precepts to Global Value Chain Governance 
Exposition on value chain governance resides on the conceptual understanding of governance structures 
and the different governance typologies that are manifested. Going by Ebers & Oerlemans, (2013) 
definition, a governance structure is understood as a mechanism that coordinates and controls economic 
transactions; these mechanisms include administration of decision-making procedures, adjudication of 
residual rights of control, contractual agreements, pricing monitoring, formal rules and regulations, and 
procedures for negotiations, conflict resolution (p.7).  
Governance typologies on the other hand were scaled up by Gereffi’s  seminal work (1994,1999) following 
Williamson’s research on governance as viewed from extremes of market or hierarchies; thes e typologies 
were largely viewed as either being buyer driven versus producer driven forms of governance. Producer 
driven commodity chains being found in  capital or labour resource intensive sectors; while buyer driven 
commodity chains, relating to  retailers or markets providing the leading role in managing the supply 
chains.  
The dichotomy of either buyer driven or producer driven commodity chains was further rearticulated by 
Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) further with the range of inter -firms governance types due to the 
realisation of complexity of inter-firms relationships in the global economy. To them, “the key insight is 
that coordination and control of global scale production systems, despite their complexity, can be 
achieved without direct ownership” (Gereffi, et al. 2005, 81). The view of governance as coordination, 
emphasizes global value chains compared to the view of governance as driver that is based on the  prior 
understanding of commodities and hence global commodity chains. This nuance points to the value 
addition dimension of the coordination.  
The germane precepts of value added chains being traced to Kogut (1984) as per the definition of value 
added chain being the process by which technology is combined with material and labour inp ut resources 
to achieve desired outputs, A single firm may consist of only one link in this process, or it may be 
extensively vertically integrated (Kogut, 1984)  As such, the typologies by Gereffi et al. (2005) include 
governance value chain structures by market  relations, modular value chains, relational value chains, 
captive value chains and hierarchical value chains. Significant to these governance structures are the 
determinants related to complexity of transactions, ability to codify transactions, capability of the supply 
base and degree of coordination and power asymmetry (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005; Gibbon, 
Bair, and Ponte, 2008).  
This research adopts Gereffi et al. (2005) and Gibbon et al. (2008) determinants by assessing complexity 
of transactions and ability to codify transactions as elaborated in nature of transaction and standard s & 
certifications respectively;  while  the degree of explicit coordination and capability of supply -base are 
elaborated under the determinants of nature of contract and supply chain integration respectively, 
coordination & control; the degree of explicit  coordination and power asymmetry is assessed under the 
nature of contract determinant. 
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3 Literature review and Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Nature of Transaction   
Nature of a transaction is largely characterised by  frequency, complexity and cost of a giv en transaction 
and the ability to codify the said transaction (Gereffi et al. 2005). Frequency of transaction is related to 
the number of repetitions of a transaction in a given period of time. Changes in transaction characteristics 
determine the variation of transaction costs, such as information, negotiation, and monitoring costs 
(Banterle and Stranieri, 2013); higher frequency of transactions brings familiarity to contracting parties 
with the exchanges in which human actors in charge of operations interact with one another; this more 
often, builds personal trust in relationships. As the level of trust increases, personal integrity may 
suppress opportunism and then reduce the degree of uncertainty. Agri -food supply chains continually 
improve due to stronger supply chain capabilities associated with increased coordination, information 
exchange, and responsiveness of the organizations involved, however, in globalised supply chains, the 
need for  formal contracts cannot be downplayed especially due the rise of uncertainties, complexity of 
transactions and cost of transaction. 
Complexity of transactions in this research follows from contribution by transaction cost economics (TCE) 
theory that adduces  the effect that reducing complexity in transactions is sought after with the aim of 
seeking efficient governance structures as well as clarifying capability roles of various actors in the value 
chain; this complements the inadequacies cited with incompleteness of contracts especially in 
uncertainties and opportunism (Williams, Maull, and Ellis, 2002). Specifically, an efficient supply chain 
architecture is one  that reduces transaction costs while affirming that complexity in production chains is 
strongly determined by product and process characteristics and spatial complexities between the raw 
material suppliers to end customers.     
3.2 Nature of Contract 
Nature of contract is also construed to be related to aspects of rights and obligations of the contracting 
parties. Some forms of contracts largely involved in the agro-sector include marketing contracts, 
production contracts and contract farming. As such, marketing contracts represent an agreement by a 
buyer to provide a market for the seller’s output; in this arrangement, the seller transfers some risks and 
decision over when and how the product is to be sold to the buyer. Production contract on the other hand 
exists where the buyer supplies and manages all the inputs on the farm and the farmer usually becomes  
simply a supplier of the land and labour. Next in the supply chain continuum, there is the contract farming 
which refers to the system of production and supply of products by farmers to the b uyers under forward 
contracts (Gyau and Spiller, 2008). Contracts as such are governance mechanism designed to attain two 
main objectives: first, to delineate authority and responsibility structure; and two,  to share risk among 
chain partners (Ghosh and Fedorowicz, 2008; Vlachos, 2014). 
Despite limitations associated with uncertainty, parties continue to contract to safeguard their interests 
as related to ownership rights. Ownership rights rationalised in economic sense  to mean property rights; 
the rights offer most effective mechanism for providing economic agents with appropriate incentives to 
create, maintain, and improve assets (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013; Chaddad and Cook, 2004). To 
Madhok (2005), ownership centred approach allows for control, which in turn al lows flexibility over 
decision-making and adaptability.  
The analysis of the formal allocation of ownership rights accordingly identifies three generic governance 
models as related to the extent to which members engage in decision management and decision c ontrol 
functions (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013); these models include  integration model, separation model, and 
delegation model;  respectively represent from the highest to the least degree of decision making and 
control.  
3.3 Level of Chain Integration 
Supply chain integration (SCI)  relates to the degree in which a focal/lead firm strategically collaborates 
and manages its intra and inter-organization processes with its supply chain partners (Flynn, Huo, and 
Zhao, 2010). The eventual goal of SCI is to achieve effective and efficient flows of products and services, 
information, money and decisions,  in order to provide maximum value to the end customer (Frohlich & 
Westbrook, 2001).  
Levels of chain integration  have been elaborated in various  varied ways by scholars; to some they consist 
of internal integration and external integration (Maleki and Cruz-machado, 2013; Tomas, Rosales, Batalha, 
and Alcantara, 2014); to others they includes product integration and process integration (Huo, Qi, Wang, 
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and Zhao, 2014)  yet other scholars have within external integration alluded to both supplier and 
customer integration (Tomas et al. 2014). This paper focuses on the level of integration from the view of 
internal integration-to include both product and process integration from the internal operation of 
exporters (Helmi, Hua, and Mohd, 2013), and external  integration to include the linkages of the 
exporters’ upstream suppliers and downstream customers through customer integration (Boon-itt and 
Wong, 2011). 
Level of chain integration is required internally within and across functions and externally across suppliers 
and customers (Boon-itt and Wong, 2011). Internal integration is characterized by full systems visibility 
across functions such as procurement, production, logistics, marketing, sales, and distribution; it is a key 
driver of competitive advantage in supply chain management (Van Hoek and Mitchell, 2006). The goal of 
internal integration is to develop a process-oriented focus; a focus on coordination across functional areas 
(Richey, Roath, Whipple, and Fawcett, 2010).  External integration involves the effective alignment, 
information sharing, and participation in the interactions between firms their suppliers and customers. 
Supplier integration promotes collaboration by means of joint efforts in product development, problem 
solving, technology exchange among others (Moharana, Murty, Senapati, and Khuntia, 2012). On the 
demand side of a supply chain, firms discern into the customer organization(s) to understand thei r 
product, culture, market and organization in such a way that they can respond rapidly to the customers’ 
needs and requirements. 
Agri-food supply chains continually improve due to stronger supply chain capabilities associated with 
increased coordination, information exchange, and responsiveness of the organizations involved. The 
degree of coordination is largely affected by factors related to changing consumer preferences, increased 
need for information management, advancement in biotechnology and environmental concerns; due to 
these factors there is increased movement from spot market type of governance to more closely 
coordinated forms of governance focusing on relational or vertically coordinated forms of governance. 
Therefore the level of coordination can be related to a particular form of governance where the levels of 
risks and returns associated; consequently, the level of chain integration aims at promoting 
interdependency, structures or formative relationships which are communicative through exchang e of 
information, collaborative alignment, profitability and competitive advantage (Engelseth, 2009).   
3.4 Standards and Certifications  
Discourse on standards and certifications have largely been fronted as either a remote governance 
instrument or a differentiation determinant to in speciality marketing. With the governance view, Abbott 
and Snidal, (2001) first point out that standards and certification schemes are applied to deal with 
externalities and are sub-categories of governance, to these authors, “externality occurs whenever on e 
actor’s conduct affects the well-being of another”(347). Secondly, adoption of standards have given rise 
to remote forms of governance by way of defining and managing value chain specific activities, setting 
conditions of participation in value chains, determining functional division of labour and barriers to entry 
along the chain (Nadvi, 2008; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005).  Finally,  as proposed by Ponte and Gibbon (2005), 
standards have become conventions to regularise by way of promoting or sanctioning functions, actors 
and their activities  have thus impacted on the management and administrative mechanisms of value 
chains and their structures as well as availed upgrading opportunities for producers or appealed means 
for sustainability (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). The rise of food standards in export value chains and the 
demand for consistent high volumes and good quality produce has led to more vertically integrated value 
chains (von Hagen & Alvarez, 2011); this view is corroborated by both Vlachos', (2014) four categorisation 
of supply chain governance typologies namely spot markets, standards, contracts and vertical integration. 
The differentiation view of standards and certifications has largely been witnessed by adoption of 
standards as an competitive incentivising tool to fresh produce importers (García Martinez & Poole, 2004; 
Garcia Martinez, Poole, Skinner, Illés, & Lehota, 2006); Reardon, Codron, Busch, Bingen, and Harris (1999) 
augment these views by the assertion that: “the role of  grades and standards (G&S)  h as shifted from a 
technical instrument to reduce transactions costs in homogenous commodity markets to a strategic 
instrument of competition in differentiated markets. The nature of G&S has shifted from performance... 
to process standards” (p. 421); to these authors three strategic responses to grades and standards have 
been applied by various agencies, namely: (i) by large private certification, labelling and branding systems; 
(ii) by medium-large domestic firms, to lobby governments to adopt public G&S similar to those in export 
markets in developed regions; (iii) by small firms to ally with public and non -profit sectors to form G&S 
and certification systems to all export markets. 
Other than the two general frontiers that the discourse on standards has tak en, standards and 
certifications have been differentiated into two strands in the horticultural export sector namely; public 
standards formed by regulations imposed on imports; such  regulations fall under the World Trade 
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Organization (WTO) rules.  These regulations are subject to the Agreements on Sanitary and Phyto-
Sanitary barriers (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The second set of standards are composed by 
standards emerging from retailers’ action and are required by several large  multinati onal retailers, some 
wholesalers and food service companies such as GlobalGAP, formerly EureGAP; these type of standards 
are described as voluntary or private standards; the depth into this duality of public and private standards 
has been exhaustively been done in Busch’s works (Busch, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014; Busch et al., 2005).  
With the entry of European supermarkets in the Fresh Fruits and Vegetable (FFV) supply chain saw the 
proliferation of standards and stringent conditions being required of the upstream agents and exporters 
for reasons related to due diligence as instigated by UK’s Food Safety Act 1990 thereafter the emergence 
of EureGAP; spawning from the public regulations a myriad of standards and certification schemes are 
currently in place. Proliferation of standards necessarily brought about further changes in FFV chain 
governance with a huge attrition of non-compliant smallholders farmers (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). The 
underlying motive of the standards and certification schemes is discussed to have both an assurance cum 
compliance objective to State agents amongst other stakeholders as well as promoting competitive 
advantage by way of  introducing entry barriers in the speciality markets (Konefal et al., 2005; Ouma, 
2010) or promoting certain credence attributes in products such as organic, natural and socially friendly 
attributes. 
This paper adopts an eclectic view to standards and certification discourse of having the standards and 
certification as a determinant as the premise to which remote governance is achieved. As such in adopting 
the approach by Ponte and Gibbon, (2005) of convention theory’s application in quality standards in the 
role of defining and managing value chain specific activities, the determinant of standards and 
certifications is applied in this research to assess its efficacy in promoting competitiveness in horticultural 
value chains especially as a consequence of promoting food quality and safety (Martino and Perugini, 
2006).   
3.5 Competitive Advantage Concept 
Porter’s (1985) value chain concept is considered a crucial tool for analysing the sources of competitive 
advantage; competitive advantage being understood as the degree in which a firm reduces its cost, 
exploits opportunities and neutralizes threats (Newbert, 2008).  Value chain analysis comprises 
disaggregation of the firm into its strategically relevant activities in order to understand the behaviour of 
costs and the existing and potential sources of differentiation (Bhatnagar & Teo, 2009). Accordingly,  by 
optimising and coordination of linkages associated with the aligned value chain actors, firms’ competitive 
advantage can be gained as a net benefit to the members.  
Optimisation and coordination alignment criterion is discerned to be aligned to capabilities that either 
centred to the value chain actors or  to capabilities that are customer cantered; specific capabilities that 
are specified to members of a given value chain are said to be based on resources that are viewed in their 
unique or inimitable capability (Zajac & Olsen, 1993); some of these capabilities that  promote inter-
organizational competitive advantage are identified by Dyer and Singh (1998: 232)  to constitute  the 
following: (1) relations specific assets; (2) knowledge-sharing routines; (3) complementary resources and 
capabilities; and (4) effective governance. Competitive capabilities that are customer oriented as 
elaborated by Li, Ragu-Nathan, Ragu-Nathan, and  Subba Rao, (2006) consist of competitive pricing,  value 
to consumer quality, dependable delivery, and production innovation.  In line with these capabilities, 
especially the customer focussed; Kenya’s FFV sector  as Dolan and Humphrey (2000) emphasizes has 
been concentrated on capabilities and strategies of quality, consistency, variety of the products, 
processing levels, product combinations, packaging, reliability of supply and price; other capabilities  that 
have been cited of the sector include quality, delivery dependability, product innovation and time to 
market.  It’s notable however that Kenya has had  uncompetitive airfreight rates compared to other 
African countries such as Egypt and Morocco for bulk produce (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000); the sector 
has been witnessed to rely more on a differentiation strategy other than cost based adva ntage.   
In toto, the aforementioned determinants under nature of transactions, standards and certifications, level 
of chain integration and nature of contracts are related to the dependent variable of competitive 
advantage through  differentiation based strategies. Based on governance value analysis, adoption of a 
given governance structures is a deliberate business strategy adopted by the chain actors through  a 
conscious and deliberate decision making process (Soares, Dorneles, & Pereira, 2010; Ghosh & John, 1999) 
that is largely a cost or differentiation option on whether to adopt a market structures, intermediate or 
hierarchical type of governance. To Gold, Seuring, and Beske, (2010), effective governance promotes 
competitive advantage by promoting value-creative initiatives, this is partly met through the transactors’ 
choice of governance structure(s) that minimizes transaction costs, thereby enhancing efficiency.  
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3.6 GVC Determinants-Competitive Advantage Hypotheses 
The earlier discussion provided support for governance value chain determinants and their contribution to 
promotion of competitive advantage. The current research tests this proposal  by examining the 
relationship between the selected GVC determinants and competitive advantage in terms of product 
differentiation, process flexibility, logistics advantage and marketing & Management innovation. The 
hypotheses (H1 through H4) for the four competitive  strategies follow: 
H1:  Standards and certifications is positively related to Kenya’s horticultural value chains     
competitive advantage: 
 H1a. product differentiation;  
H1b. process flexibility; 
H1c. logistics advantage; and 
H1d. marketing & management innovation. 
 
H2:  Level  of chain integration is  positively related to Kenya’s horticultural value chains 
competitive advantage: 
H2a. product differentiation;  
H2b. process flexibility; 
H2c. logistics advantage; and 
H2d. marketing & management innovation. 
 
H3:  Nature of transaction is  positively related to Kenya’s horticultural value chains competitive 
advantage: 
H3a. product differentiation;  
H3b. process flexibility; 
H3c. logistics advantage; and 
H3d. marketing & management innovation. 
 
H4:  Nature of contract is  positively related to Kenya’s horticultural value chains competitive 
advantage: 
H4a. product differentiation;  
H4b. process flexibility; 
H4c. logistics advantage; and 
H4d. marketing & management innovation. 
 
Figure 1 presents the conceptual model with hypotheses. 
4 Methodology  
A general review of the GVC literature provided the foundation of this study. A cross section survey was 
conducted to collect data that was used to test hypotheses. A census survey was adopted due to the small 
proportion of  the population of one hundred and twenty exporter firms in the horticultural export sector;  
this was opted for in line  to Israel, (1992) recommendation whereby, census is appropriate for two 
hundred or less units since it eliminates sampling error and provides data on all individuals in the 
population with precision and accuracy; however Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins, (2001); Krejcie and 
Morgan, (1970) propose samples for fewer populations. The study was conducted in  between the months 
of November 2015 and January, 2016; the accessible population were either the owners of the exporting 
companies, their agronomists, quality assurance officers, or pack-house managers/supervisors. A semi-
structured questionnaire was used. Both the study and targeted population consisted of a 83 respondents 
representing  69 percent of the 120 exporters registered with both fresh produce exporters association of 
Kenya (FPEAK) and Horticultural Crops Directorate (HCD) in Kenya.  
Data was analysed using SPSS version 24 with the categorical principal component analysis (CATPCA) 
reduction feature also known as nonlinear principal component analysis (PCA) (Linting and van der Kooij, 
2012; Meulman, Van der Kooij, and Heiser, 2004) owing to the categorical nature of the  variables under 
the research study. The use of CATPCA was aimed at reducing the observed variables to a number of 
uncorrelated principal components which are explained as the key components ass ociated to food value 
chain governance determinants on the competitiveness of Kenya’s horticultural exports.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
Categorical principal component analysis (CATPCA) was adopted to principal component analysis (PCA) 
method; the latter is largely meant to reduce the number of given variables to a smaller number of 
uncorrelated variables called principal components which account  for the variance in the data as much as 
possible. While PCA is suitable for continuous variables which are scaled at the numerical level of 
measurement such that interval or ratio it also assumes linear relationship among variables, it is thus not 
an appropriate method of dimension reduction for categorical variables (Kemalbay and Korkmazoğlu, 
2014). 
CATPCA thus presented several advantages over standard PCA. First, CATPCA allows incorporating 
nominal and ordinal variables; second, it does not assume that the relationships between variables are 
linear, and can therefore handle nonlinear relationships between variables (Claveria and Poluzzi, 2016). 
This is explained by the nature of categorical variables whereby unlike numerical variables, they are 
described by indicators with a limited number of categories. The zero in binary variable scales is 
uncertain, the relationship among the different categories is also unknown, and although some of the 
variables are composed of categories that are ordered, their mutual distances are as well unknown; so the 
method of CATPCA is thus adapted (Antonelli and Taurino, 2009). Third, CATPCA can also handle well 
small data (Odekerken-Schröder, Hennig-Thurau, and Knaevelsrud, 2010). 
5 Factor Analysis, Statistical Analysis and Results 
There were 120 fresh fruits and vegetable exporter firms targeted from whom 83 respon ded to the 
survey, a response rate of 69 percent was achieved. The sector demographics indicated that, ownership of 
the exporter firms relate to sole proprietorship, partnership and limited liability companies, these were 
respectively represented in percentages of 8.4, 7.2 and 84.3. The age of the exporter firms represented in 
percentage and categorised in the range of firms below 5 years, 6-10 years, 11-19 years and 20 years and 
above was 31.6, 25.0, 26.3 and 17.1 respectively. Majority of the exporters representing 66.3 percent 
were involved with exports of both fruits and vegetables while exporters who dealt exclusively with 
vegetables and fruits represented 21.7 and 7.2 percent respectively; 4.1 percent of the exporters 
exclusively dealt in processing of  both or either fruits and vegetables. Export destinations for Kenyan 
fresh fruits and vegetables is largely dominated by Europe Union, specifically to United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, France, Germany and Sweden  other   regional destinations include Middle E ast and Eastern 
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and South Africa.  
Two phases of CATPCA analysis were carried out; The first phase for the analysis was to assess significant 
indicators elaborating on the individual variables of nature of contract, standards and certifications, 
supply chain integration and nature of transactions; the second phase entailed a joint CATPCA for all the 
factors that with significant loading to all variables for the purpose of further analysis of their effect to 
competitive advantage of Kenya’s horticultural export sector. 
Initial CATPCA phase was carried out independently to the four supply chain governance variables namely 
nature of transactions, nature of contract, standards & certification and supply chain integration in order 
to ascertain the indicators with factor loading of 0.4 and above;  indicators with factor loading of 0.4 and 
above were therefore retained for the purpose of the joint CATPCA analysis. First, under the variable of 
nature of transactions the following eight indicators were selected;  type business ownership (0.720); 
countries of export categorized (0.675); frequency of export (-0.423); outsourced factors production, 
processing & logistics (-0.613); exclusive agreements with importers (0.699); direct orders from European 
retail (-0.591); selling through middle merchants (0.599); use of export processing village (0.563). The  
second variable of standards & certification had the following six indicators, namely: good agricultural 
practices (gap) in place (1.143); gaps audits conducted (1.143); categories of standards place (-0.753); 
documented procedure for recall (0.696); conducted mock recall (0.771); products guarantee to 
importers, retailers or ultimate consumers (0.752). 
Thirdly, the variable under  nature of contract garnered ten indicators which included the following type 
of contract arrangements: import oral contract (-0.420); import sales contract (-0.540); import production 
& sales contract (0.590); supplier oral contract (0.414); supplier sales contract (0.571); supplier production 
& sales contract (0.585); brokers engagement (0.643); engage brokers in oral contract (0.512); engage 
brokers in sales contract (0.651); engage brokers in production & sales contract (0.627). Finally, the fourth 
variable under value chain integration had the following sixteen indicators that had a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.4 and above, these indictors included responses by exporters the following statements:  strong internal 
information sharing (0.518); joint management decisions (0.783); frequent interdepartmental  meetings 
(0.801); open door policy (0.636); close supplier contact (0.802); constant customer feedback with our 
suppliers (0.924); sharing of production forecast with customers (0.802); involvement of supplier in 
quality inspection (0.782); establishment of close customer contact (0.802); involvement of suppliers in 
quality inspection (0.782); joint decision making between suppliers & customers (0.983); collaboration 
with regulators (0.439); emphasis on supplier-customer openness (0.985); promotion of strong corporate 
relations (0.793); ensuring quality monitoring (0.987) and coordinate in quality control issues (0.598). 
The selected indicators representative of the four supply chain governance determinants were in the 
second phase subjected to a joint CATPCA analysis in order to ascertain that they were uncorrelated.  
Table 1 summarises the output of the results and their loadings. The result of the output loadings realised 
five dimensions; specific to each dimension, factor loadings of 0.4 and above were retained for the 
purposes of running regressions. Apart from the factor loadings criterion, Kaiser criterion of retaining only 
dimensions with eigenvalues greater or equivalent to 1 was used; in essence  Kaiser criterion elaborates 
that a factor explains at least as much variance as the equivalent of one variable,  otherwise it should be 
left out (Antonelli and Taurino, 2009). Summary of the dimensions is given as follows. 
Indicators under dimension 1 that had a loading of 0.4 and above constituted the following, namely;  good 
agricultural practices (GAP) in place (0.959); good agricultural practices (GAP) documented (0.959); gaps 
audits regularly conducted (0.959); we promote interdepartmental meetings with our different 
departments & units (0.959) and we have an ‘open door’ policy to our stakeholders (0.731); feedback to 
suppliers shared (0.844); supplier involvement in quality inspection (0.958) and quality control 
coordination (0.456). Upon review of the indicators listed, dimension 1 was relabeled as standards and 
certifications  in line with the with involvement of the horticultural exporters in strict GAP practices; 
suppliers involvement in quality as well as quality coordination being highly appraised under consultative 
decision making processes that are paramount in sustaining quality standards along the value chain.  
Dimension 2 tapped on the following statements, namely; we promote internal information sharing 
(0.595); we  have close supplier contact (0.924); we share feedback from importers to our suppliers 
(0.844); we share our supplier forecast with customers (0.925);  we establish close customer contact 
(0.925) and brokers are part of downstream actors. This dimension was relabeled as level of chain 
integration. This dimension was related  to integration largely  due to the link between close supplier and 
customer contacts shared through joint forecasting, synergized communication, quality monitoring and 
enhanced openness and corporate relations. 
Dimension 3 constituted of four indicators; namely,  decision making is communicated to our suppliers & 
customers (0.966); we emphasis openness (0.965); we have strong corporate relations (0.764) and we 
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have quality monitoring in our systems (0.966). Dimension 3 was relabeled as relational characteristics 
with emphasis being relational aspects centered on communication between suppliers and customers, 
strong corporate relations guided by openness and promotion of quality monitoring systems and 
processes.  
Dimension 4 constituted of  eleven indicators, namely type of business ownership (-0.480); countries of 
exports categories (-0.550); direct orders from European retailers (0.503); codification of standards ( -
0.587); exporters engagement with importers through sales contracts (-0.409); Production & Sales 
contracts (0.450) and importers forming part of the upstream actors through ownership of part of 
production (0.468);  exporters engagement with  suppliers through sales contracts (-0.442) and 
production & Sales contracts (-0.551); brokers engagement  (-0.405) is firmed up through  brokers’ oral 
contracts (-0.524) or production & sales contracts (-0.456). Dimension 4 was relabeled as nature of 
transactions relating  to the way horticultural exporting is conducted to destination countries; to some 
countries export demand such as in EU regulation are considered homogenous export demand s especially 
in food safety standard requirements; other destinations may require varied conditions to be met and 
hence being described as having heterogeneous export demands. Respectively, exporters working with 
the latter type of  demands would be required to have their upstream and downstream actors 
commensurately aligned in response to these unique transactions.   
This dimension also related  strongly with the preference by importers being integrated upstream with 
production for enforcement of certain requisite demands or engaging in production and sales type of 
contracts; other contract types that are witnessed under this dimension although the indicators are 
negative in sign include engagement of sales contracts by importers and suppliers as well as th e 
involvement of brokers through oral, or production & sales types of contracts. The plausible view for 
support of oral contracts as well as engagement of brokers by many exporters can be related to external 
contingencies; these contingencies may be due to two factors namely, the short product life cycle of fresh 
fruits and vegetable exports and contingency reasons. It makes it easier for exporters to work with 
brokers with the sector’s experience as a reliable alternative especially in  filling in demand s hort falls of 
the ordered quantities that may not be well forecasted or for cost reasons related to buffer inventory 
carrying costs.   
Dimension 5 constituted of contract related indicators to  frequency of exports to importers (0.408); 
various forms of contracting suppliers or brokers for various factors of production. These forms of 
contracts loaded as follows; exporters engagement with importers through sales contract (-0.418); 
production & sales contracts (0.559); exporters engagement with  suppliers through production & Sales 
contracts (0.524); exporters engagement with brokers was confirmed (0.618);  through  oral contracts 
(0.568); sales contracts (0.629) and  through production & sales contracts (0.654). Dimension 5 was 
relabeled as nature of contracts largely due to  two conditions related to  frequency of exports and the 
general framework related to the various contract forms adopted. Depending on the level of engagement 
and collaborations, contracts are in this sector operationalized as oral contracts to largely trust driven 
firms and either production & sales or sales contracts to adversarial or short term transactions type of 
engagements. While the recourse to brokers engagement is evident, their role is largely considered 
adversarial and mostly relied upon for contingency and short-term;  on the other hand while exigency 
reasons for engaging brokers hold true, exporters stand the risk of losing key customer accounts due to 
reliance of brokers especially if products are compromised.  
Overall as per table 1, the five dimensional CATPCA components/dimensions were interpreted in this 
study as standards & certifications, level of chain integration, relational characteristics, nature of 
transactions and nature of contracts. The  extracted dimensions  realized eigenvalues greater than one 
with sufficient reliability; the total Cronbach alpha for all the dimensions was 0.987 with a total 
eigenvalue of 22.850; each of the extracted dimensions had a Cronbach alpha of 0.895, 0.835, 0.768, 
0.718 and 0.678 respectively with a variance accounted for by each of the dimensions being 7.515, 5.222, 
3.911, 3.287 and 2.915  for each of the extracted dimensions respectively. The percentage variance 
accounted for by the five dimensions were 33, 23, 17, 14 and 13 respectively. 
CATPCA analysis was also conducted to  the dependent variable on competitive advantage; this was 
effected to the individual sub-variables linked to differentiation strategies of product differentiation, 
process flexibility, logistics advantage, and marketing & management innovation. Iindicators with factor 
loading of 0.4 and above were therefore retained for each of the sub-variables for the purpose of  
regression analysis with the defined GVC determinants. A single component defining each of the sub -
variables was obtained from the CATPCA.  
The loading of the indicators respective to each of the sub-variables is specified;  first, under the sub-
variable of product differentiation the following nine indicators were selected;  process assurance in 
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products (0.425); natural and socially produced products (0.575); convenient and ready to eat products 
(0.722); new product varieties (0.624); juices and drinks (0.619); ready to eat snack (0.736); products with 
sensory characteristics of unique taste (0.688), texture & color appeal (0.508) and product mixes (0.616). 
The second sub-variable on process flexibility had the following five indicators, namely: rapid product 
change  (0.655); ease of adjustment to production volumes (0.706); ease of  handling product mixes 
(0.643); ability to customize orders fast (0.690), and promptness in handling complains (0.751). Thirdly, 
the sub-variable of logistical advantage under competitive advantage garnered five indicators which 
included securing sufficient air cargo volumes  (0.809); seamless logistics flows (0.650); accuracy to locate 
dispatched products (0.683); presence of reverse logistics/product recall plans (0.551) and availably of 
specialized/cold chain transport (0.825). Lastly, the fourth sub-variable  on marketing and management 
organization innovativeness under competitive advantage had the following 10 indicators that had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.4 and above, these indictors included; presence of marketing innovation (0.680);  
new marketing methods (0.752); new product designs (0.586); new packaging (0.787); new product 
placements (0.743); new product promotion (0.794); new product pricing (0.635); management 
organization innovation by: knowledge management (0.558), business practices (0.494) and external 
relations (0.529).  
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Table 1. 
CATPCA and Reliability on Joint Value Chain Governance Determinants 
 
Dimension 
1 2 3 4 5 
Business Ownership -0.031 -0.391 -0.263 -0.470 0.077 
Countries of Export Categorized 0.020 -0.321 0.008 -0.550 -0.391 
Frequency of Export to Importers 0.049 0.051 0.055 0.311 0.408 
Direct orders from European Retail (Mkt) -0.041 0.098 0.347 0.503 -0.185 
Good Agricultural Practices (QA) 0.959 -0.244 0.063 -0.027 0.074 
Is the GAPs Documented (QA) 0.959 -0.244 0.063 -0.027 0.074 
Gaps audits Conducted (QA) 0.959 -0.244 0.063 -0.027 0.074 
Codification of Standards -0.172 -0.087 -0.224 -0.587 -0.125 
Internal  information Sharing  0.124 0.595 -0.053 0.191 -0.128 
Joint Management decisions 0.959 -0.244 0.062 -0.027 0.074 
Interdepartmental Meetings 0.960 -0.241 0.062 -0.027 0.072 
Open Door Policy 0.731 -0.157 0.034 0.041 0.183 
Close Supplier Contact 0.226 0.924 -0.122 -0.218 -0.020 
Feedback to Suppliers Shared 0.844 0.485 -0.043 -0.168 0.036 
Customer Supplier Forecast 0.226 0.925 -0.121 -0.217 -0.020 
Supplier involvement in quality inspection 0.958 -0.245 0.067 -0.018 0.075 
Close Customer Contact 0.225 0.925 -0.122 -0.218 -0.013 
Decision making done by suppliers & Customers -0.044 0.089 0.966 -0.117 -0.082 
Emphasis Openness -0.042 0.098 0.965 -0.114 -0.087 
Corporate Relations -0.049 0.052 0.764 -0.157 -0.059 
Quality Monitoring    -0.043 0.091 0.966 -0.116 -0.087 
Quality Control Coordination  0.456 0.326 -0.060 0.239 -0.071 
Import Sales Contracts 0.100 -0.008 0.028 -0.409 -0.418 
Import Production & Sales Contracts 0.001 0.353 -0.005 0.450 0.559 
Importer integrated upstream -0.007 -0.320 -0.272 0.468 0.163 
Supplier Sales Contract 0.128 -0.025 -0.209 -0.442 -0.331 
Supplier Production & Sales Contracts -0.033 0.352 0.244 0.310 0.524 
Brokers engagement -0.378 -0.246 0.087 -0.405 0.618 
Broker engaged through Oral Contract -0.026 -0.038 0.019 -0.524 0.568 
Broker engaged through Sales Contract -0.328 0.114 0.051 -0.397 0.629 
Brokers engaged by Production & Sales Contract -0.032 -0.057 0.066 -0.456 0.654 
Broker part of with downstream Supplier -0.225 -0.921 0.123 0.224 0.017 
Dimension 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Total 
(Eigenvalue) 
% Variance 
Accounted For 
1. Standards & Certification  0.895 7.515 33 
2. Level of Chain Integration  0.835 5.222 23 
3. Relational Characteristics 0.768 3.911 17 
4.Nature of Transactions 0.718 3.287 14 
5. Nature of Contracts 0.678 2.915 13 
Total 0.987
a
 22.850 100 
a. Total Cronbach's Alpha is based on the total Eigenvalue. 
 
Overall, the respective competitive advantage’s sub-variables garnered the following Cronbach’s alpha 
and eigen values; product differentiation (0.800; 3.456), process flexibility (0.728; 2.393), logistics 
advantage (0.756; 2.528) and marketing & management organisation by innovation  (0.859; 4.411). 
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The combined effect of the GVC determinants to the respective competitive advantage’s sub -variables of 
product differentiation, process flexibility, logistics advantage and marketing & management organisation 
by innovation were determined by multiple regression analysis.  
The determinants considered as independent variables were standards and certifications, nature of 
transactions, value chain integration, relational characteristics and nature of contracts which were 
analysed to determine their effect to the dependent variable of competitive advantage under product 
differentiation, process flexibility, logistics advantage, and marketing & management innovation sub -
variables. The regression results are presented in table 2. 
The hypotheses were tested by using multiple regression analysis. First, each of the hypotheses H1 
through H4 concerning the influence of standards on innovation; the outcomes were tested using multiple 
regression analysis. Each of the antecedent variables was first regressed on to each competitive 
advantage outcome in a standard linear expression (Y = b0 +b1 X). Table 2 shows the results of the 
hypotheses testing. The left-hand portion of the table illustrates the direct effects of standards & 
certifications, nature of transactions, value chain integration, relational characterises and nature of 
contract on  the different competitive advantage related to the differentiation strategies tested.  
Table 2. 
Results for Multiple Regressions 
Direct Effect 
Product 
Differentiation 
Process 
Flexibility 
Logistics 
Advantage 
Marketing and 
Management 
Innovations 
  β β β β 
Standards & Certification  0.136 0.209** 0.775*** 0.226** 
Level of Chain Integration  -0.029 0.136 -0.184** 0.061 
Relational Characteristics 0.065 0.191 -0.028 0.175 
Nature of Transactions 0.320** 0.226** 0.014 0.181 
Nature of Contracts 0.145 -0.021 0.123 0.318*** 
F 2.716 2.780 28.272 4.335 
R
2
 0.150 0.153 0.647 0.220 
Model Significance 0.026 0.023 0.001 0.002 
Notes  *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001;       
 
The results indicate that Standards & certifications had a direct effect on  process flexibil ity (β = 0.209;  p 
< 0.05), logistics advantage (β = 0.775;  p < 0.001) and marketing & management innovations product 
innovations (β = 0.226;  p < 0.05). The level of chain integration has a negative effect to logistics 
advantage (β = -0.184;  p < 0.05); there was no effect on relational characteristics to competitive 
advantage. Nature of transactions had a positive and direct effect on product differentiation (β = 0.320;  p 
< 0.05).  and process flexibility (β = 0.226;  p < 0.05); lastly nature of contracts had a positive effect in the 
way that marketing and management organisation innovations (β = 0.318;  p < 0.001)  were aligned. 
Figure 2 details the seven direct relationships supporting the relationships supporting hypotheses H1b, 
H1c, H1d, H2c, H3a, H3b and H4d. 
Martin Kang’ethe et al. / Int. J. Food System Dynamics 8 (4), 2017, 317-335 
330 
 
 
  
                                                                        β=0.209**         β=0.320**    
                                                                                  
                                                                                               β=0.226**    
                                                                                β= -0.184**      β=0.775***    
                                                                                           
β= 0.226**     β=0.226**    
                                                                
                                                                   
                                                                    β= 0.318*** 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Examination of the Main Effects 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Today firms, agencies and stakeholders operating under the global value chain are to a large extent 
required to adjust to a particular GVC configuration of activities, decisions and their i mplications. The 
choice in any GVC configuration is set on the premises of governance, location and coordination of the 
specific chain activities; the implications for such a configuration  are largely assessed on upgrading and 
performance measures. This demands are demanded as well by horticultural value chains to no exception.  
The strive for best alignment, strategic positioning and coordination to global value chains has continually 
been set against an assessment of governance  related determinants on nature of transactions, ability to 
codify these transactions and assessment of the capabilities of the supply base at the firm, national, 
regional and international level; however, changes experienced to horticultural value chains especially 
pertaining to safety and standards mechanisms in the last two decades have warranted the reassessment 
of these determinants. 
The re-assessment of the forestated determinants in this research and as guided by literature to seek the 
efficacy of standards and certifications, nature of transactions, level of supply chain integration, nature of 
contracts and relational characteristics as critical dimensions to export driven horticultural value chains.  
The study affirms and corroborates statistically the centrality of  these d eterminants to the sector’s 
competitive strategies -product differentiation, process flexibility, logistical advantage and innovations 
related to marketing and organisational management - to developing economies in their trade with 
developed economies. Novel to this research is critical role of standards and certifications as 
characteristic and strategic instrument of competitiveness through the promotion of process flows that 
have traceability principles in place, promotion of logistics advantage and innovative marketing and 
organisational management practices. Due to differentiated export markets demands the nature of 
transactions  remains the key factor in promotion of horticultural GVCs especially in transactional costs 
analysis. The level of chain integration and nature of contracts have facilitated in logistics coordination 
and promotion of marketing & management organisation’s innovations respectively. Overall, standards 
and certification schemes have a forceful impact on the management and administrat ive mechanisms of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
Value Chain Governance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value Chain Governance 
Determinants 
 
Nature of Transaction 
 
 
Nature of Contract                                
 
Level of Chain Integration 
 
Standards & Certification 
Logistics Advantage 
 
 
Marketing & Management 
Innovations 
 
Process Flexibility 
 
Product Differentiation 
Martin Kang’ethe et al. / Int. J. Food System Dynamics 8 (4), 2017, 317-335 
331 
value chains and their structures; as in the case of Kenya’s horticultural export sector the said standards 
have availed upgrading opportunities for producers. The rise of food standards in export value chains and 
the demand for consistent high volumes and good quality produce has as well increased the need for 
contingency planning and increased corporate relations. As an emerging phenomena, horticultural sector 
producers are increasingly realigning the traditional GVC structures to curren tly favouring hybrid 
governance structures with greater flexibilities and expediency that is synchronised with the constraints 
related to short-product life cycle of fresh fruits and vegetable exports and changing customer demands.  
6.1 Limitations  
This study has several limitations that should be noted before generalizing the results to all firms. First, 
this study is cross sectional looking at essentially one industry (horticultural) and one period of time. 
Additionally, the timing of the study was meant to ensure as many firms would participate owing to the 
seasonality of the sector that renders some firms not be active throughout the year hence the possibility 
of adopting two periods of time would increase the number of firms that would participate. Fina lly, the 
setting of the survey instrument was largely dichotomous in nature and hence the adoption of CATPCA 
factor analysis, a similar research could be modelled in future studies to better understand other 
exploratory analysis in the sector that has applied in-depth and detailed case studies. 
6.2 Implications for Future Research 
The limitations of this study open up an extended research window in adoption of governance     choices. 
First, supply chain and GVC researchers would extend this study to examine multiple industries. For 
example, one would expect the floriculture sector to experience different outcomes in terms of a specific 
governance choice. Multiple industry and country analysis should be employed to develop a better 
theoretical grounding of GVC governance choices. 
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